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Abstract 
The role of regulators in pensions has been transformed in recent years, with underlying forces including 
the ongoing shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions, the shift to risk based supervision 
for defined benefit and defined contribution plans, the role of accounting standards and transparency 
(contributing to market discipline) and the turbulence in financial markets. We provide an overview of the 
evolution of regulation using evidence from selected countries under each topic. We contend that a 
number of the developments in regulation have played a part in the shift of pension portfolios towards 
lower risk, that may yet cause difficulties for future pension income. These shifts also leave open a 
number of outstanding questions, notably whether education of consumers is sufficient, the role of 
longevity risk and whether regulation can be made more counter cyclical. 
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Chapter 9
Evolving Roles for Pension Regulations: 
Toward Better Risk Control?
E. Philip Davis
Pension regulation has been transformed in recent years, with the central theme 
being an increasing focus on protection of beneficiaries against various forms of 
risk. These changes render less relevant much of what was written in the past (e.g. 
Davis 1995a). Underlying forces include the ongoing shift from defined benefit 
(DB) to defined contribution (DC) pensions, the shift to risk-based supervision 
for DB and DC plans, changes in accounting standards and transparency (con-
tributing to market discipline), and the turbulence in financial markets in recent 
years. These forces have engendered a greater awareness of the risks to retirement 
income security that are inherent in the use of funding to provide for pensions, and 
given rise to attempts by regulation to seek to reduce these risks to the extent that is 
feasible and cost-effective.
This chapter offers an overview of the evolution of pension regulation, with a 
particular focus on regulatory attempts to control risk and using evidence from 
selected countries under each topic. As regards outcomes, in our view there has 
been an improvement in retirement income security as a consequence of the focus 
of regulation on risk. That said, a number of the regulatory developments have 
stimulated a shift of DB pension portfolios toward lower risk and hence lower 
return assets, which may yet cause difficulties for future pension income. These 
shifts also leave open a number of outstanding questions that are related to risk, 
notably whether education of consumers is sufficient to apprise them of the risk 
tradeoffs in their pension planning, the neglected role of longevity risk in retire-
ment income provision, and whether regulation can be made more countercy-
clical to avoid macroprudential risks affecting both pension funds and the wider 
economy.
In what follows, we first consider the question of why pension plans are regu-
lated, highlighting the role of risk, and then we move to general portfolio regu-
lations, the traditional means of regulating risk. Next we examine the evolving 
regulation of DB plans focused on risk, including the role of market discipline 
and accounting standards. We go on to analyze the changing regulation of DC 
plans, touching on issues again linked directly or indirectly to risk, including costs, 
annuitization, and outcomes. A final section considers some weaknesses of current 
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pension regulation in respect of risk, and we conclude by considering whether 
pension funds need a global agreement focusing on risks akin to those addressed 
by Basel III for banking.
Why Regulate Pension Funds?
Abstracting from issues of redistribution, a case for public intervention in the 
operation of markets arises when there is a market failure, in other words, when 
a set of market prices fails to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome. Thus from an eco-
nomic standpoint, when competitive markets achieve efficient outcomes, there is 
no case for regulation.
Three key types of market failure arise in finance, namely those relating to 
information asymmetry, externality, and monopoly. These apply in differing 
degrees depending on the type of financial institution; in particular, there are 
quite distinctive problems associated with banks as opposed to pension funds 
(Davis 2012). But a finance-based approach is not the only way to view pension 
fund regulation. It can also be argued that enhancing equity, adequacy, and secu-
rity of pension arrangements can be seen as objectives of pension fund regula-
tion independent of financial aspects, focusing on member rights and the financial 
security of plans (Laboul and Yermo 2006). Tax privileges to pension funds are 
emblematic of this alternative approach.
We begin, however, with a discussion of arguments based on pension funds’ 
status as financial institutions (Davis 1995b; McCarthy and Neuberger 2009). 
Regarding information asymmetry, when it is difficult or costly for the purchaser 
of a financial service to obtain sufficient information on the quality of the service 
in question, he may be vulnerable to exploitation. This could entail fraudulent, 
negligent, incompetent, or unfair treatment, as well as failure of the relevant insti-
tution per se.
Such phenomena are of particular importance for retail users of financial ser-
vices such as those provided by pension funds, because clients seek investment of a 
sizeable proportion of their wealth, contracts are one-off, and they involve a com-
mitment over time. Moreover, such consumers are unlikely to find it economic to 
make a full assessment of the risks to which pension funds are exposed—includ-
ing, for DB funds, the sponsor’s solvency and the level of funding backing pension 
claims in case of sponsor bankruptcy. Participants may not even be aware of costs, 
returns, volatility, and the range of outcomes for prospective pensions. Hence the 
need for ‘consumer protection’-style regulation for pension funds—and consumer 
education. We consider this form of risk focus to be the most important element 
in pension regulation and that on which most recent innovations have largely 
focused, for example in portfolio regulations for all funds, risk-based regulations 
and solvency rules for DB funds, and regulation of costs, risks, and outcomes for 
DC funds as well.
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Such asymmetries are evidently less important for wholesale users of finan-
cial markets (such as pension funds themselves in their dealings with investment 
banks), as these typically have better information, hold considerable countervail-
ing power, and carry out repeated transactions with each other. A partial pro-
tection against exploitation, even for retail consumers, is likely to arise from the 
desire of financial institutions such as life insurers offering personal pensions to 
maintain their reputation, or equally for nonfinancial companies to retain a good 
reputation in the labor market—a capital asset that would depreciate if custom-
ers or employees were to be exploited. Nevertheless, accounting standards can be 
seen as a protection for wholesale creditors and investors when dealing with funds 
and their sponsors.
Externalities arise when the actions of certain agents have non-priced conse-
quences on others. The most obvious type of potential externality in financial 
markets relates to the liquidity risk underlying contagious bank runs, when failure 
of one bank leads to a heightened risk of failure by others, whether due to direct 
financial linkages (e.g. interbank claims) or shifts in perceptions on the part of 
depositors as to the creditworthiness of certain banks in the light of failure of oth-
ers. ‘Runs’ may also occur for other types of institutions, such as investment banks. 
But given the matching of long-run liabilities and long-run assets in pension funds, 
such externalities are less likely here. There are other possible externalities from 
failure of pension funds—notably to the state, whether as direct guarantor or as 
provider of pensions to those lacking them (Impavido and Tower 2009)—and 
similar investments by pension funds may give rise to macroprudential risks to 
financial markets as well as to funds themselves. This explains the provision of, 
for example, guarantee schemes for DB funds and countercyclical regulations. 
Positive externalities may also lead governments to encourage pension funds, such 
as a desire to economize on the costs of social security or foster the development of 
capital markets.
Market failure may also arise when there is some degree of market power. This 
may be of particular relevance for pension funds, notably when membership is 
compulsory; here attention to the interests of members is of particular impor-
tance, whether there is asymmetric information or not. As argued by Altman 
(1992), employers in an unregulated environment offering a pension fund effec-
tively on a monopoly basis may structure plans to take care of their own interests 
and concerns, so for example they can institute onerous vesting rules and better 
terms for management than for workers. They may also want freedom to fund (or 
not) as they wish, and maintain pension assets for their own use, regardless of the 
risk of bankruptcy. They may not take care of the retirement needs of some groups 
in society, such as frequent job changers, young workers, or women with broken 
careers due to childbearing. Union pressure may ameliorate some of these prob-
lems for employees, but not for the most peripheral groups. This form of regula-
tion, while as important as the others, has undergone less change in recent years 
than the focus on risk.
166 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
Some would argue that pension funds should be regulated independently of 
these standard justifications, for example to ensure that tax benefits are not mis-
used and that the goals of equity, adequacy, and security of retirement income 
are achieved—in effect correcting the market failures in annuities markets that 
necessitate pension funds and social security (Laboul and Yermo 2006). This can 
be seen as an alternative way of justifying a focus on risk in pension regulation, in 
that in its absence, equity, adequacy, and security are less likely to be achieved. 
Annuitization regulations could also be justified in this way. Regulation may also 
be based on the desire for economic efficiency—for example removing barriers to 
labor mobility—and indeed financial efficiency, so firms’ costs in running pension 
funds are minimized and pensions are affordable for members.
Moreover, Altman (1992) suggests that the term ‘private pension’ is itself a mis-
nomer, as the distinction between private and public programs is increasingly 
blurred. Terms and conditions are often prescribed by the government; they are 
publicly supported by tax subsidies; there is compulsory provision in several coun-
tries; and in some countries, private funds take over part of the earnings-related 
social security provision function.
Regulations are, of course, not costless, and it is emphasized below that exces-
sive regulatory burdens may discourage provision of private pensions when it is 
voluntary. It can also reduce the competitiveness of companies when provision 
is compulsory (Laboul and Yermo 2006). There is a trade-off of cost and benefit 
security, which regulators must consider and handle. Some would argue that the 
focus on risk in regulation has been excessive for DB funds and stimulated their 
replacement by DC, for example.
To guide our overview of developments in pension regulation and their relation 
to risk, we offer a schematic table which indicates the different types of regulation, 
the risks they address, their principal level of application, and the main countries 
cited. Table 9.1 provides an overview and guide to what follows.
Changing Investment Regulations for  
Collective Pension Funds
Investment regulations are the traditional means whereby pension regulators 
have sought to control risks arising from funding of pensions, be they corporate 
or public DC or DB plans (Davis 2002). In a country adopting quantitative asset 
restrictions (QAR), the government enforces specific regulations, typically limit-
ing holding of particular classes of assets deemed ‘risky’. The logic of QAR or 
‘prudent investment’ rules is that prudence is equal to safety, where security of 
assets is measured instrument-by-instrument according to a fixed standard. Focus 
is placed on the investment itself.
Typically QAR involves limits on holdings of assets with relatively volatile nom-
inal returns, low liquidity, or high credit risk, such as equities, venture capital/
Table 9.1 Types of regulation and related risks
Regulation Main risk addressed Principal application Main countries 
cited
Portfolio regulations Risky asset portfolio Fund-by-fund U.K. and U.S. 
(PPR); E.U., 
Japan (transition); 
Germany (QAR)
Defined benefit funds:
Risk-based regulation Shortfall risk, 
especially due 
to asset/liability 
mismatch
Fund-by-fund Netherlands, 
Germany, U.K., 
U.S.
Tighter solvency rules Shortfall risk Fund-by-fund Netherlands, U.K., 
U.S.
Guarantees Bankruptcy of sponsor System-wide U.K., U.S.
Accounting standards Risk to investors and 
creditors
System-wide U.K., Netherlands, 
International 
accounting 
standards
Defined contribution funds:
Costs Risk of inadequate 
returns and hence 
pension
System-wide U.K., Poland, 
Argentina, 
Sweden, Chile, 
US, Australia
Outcomes and risks Risk of volatility close 
to retirement
Individuals and funds Australia, Denmark, 
Mexico, Sweden, 
Chile
Annuitization Risk of outliving 
pension assets
Individual by 
individual
U.S., U.K., 
Australia, Chile, 
Switzerland
Transparency and 
education
Risk of inadequate 
saving and 
inappropriate 
investment
Individual by 
individual
Denmark, Mexico, 
Australia, 
Poland, Chile
Current weaknesses:
(Mortality tables 
and mortality 
risk-sharing)
Longevity risk to both 
DB and DC funds
System-wide US, Switzerland, 
Netherlands
(Counter cyclical 
funding and 
investment)
Risks of wider market 
volatility
System-wide Canada, U.S., 
Netherlands, 
Japan, 
Switzerland
Source: Author’s depiction.
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unquoted shares, and real estate, as well as foreign assets, even if their mean 
returns are relatively high. By contrast, under the prudent person rule (PPR), an 
OECD definition is that ‘a fiduciary must discharge his or her duties with the care, 
skill, prudence and diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and aims’ (Galer 2002: 45). 
Hence, there must be an investment strategy whereby pension assets are invested 
prudently, just as someone would do in the conduct of his own affairs.
The PPR has generally been seen as an economically superior approach, since 
it permits funds to attain the frontier of efficient portfolios as well as optimize the 
risk–return trade-off given the maturity of the fund and the risks to which it is 
exposed (Davis and Hu 2009). PPR allows a free market to operate throughout 
the investment process, while ensuring, along with solvency regulations (for DB 
funds) and appropriate decisions regarding contributions in the light of market 
conditions, that there is both adequacy of assets and an appropriate level of risk. 
By focusing unduly on the risk and liquidity of individual assets, QAR fails to take 
into account the fact that, at the portfolio level, both default risk and price volatil-
ity can be reduced by diversification. Liquidity risk depends on the overall liquid-
ity position of the investor and not on the liquidity of individual instruments. QAR 
may prevent taking into account the duration of the liabilities, which can differ 
sharply between sponsors and funds, as well as over time.
Indeed, in PPR there is usually an implicit or explicit presumption that diversi-
fication of investments is a key indicator of prudence, in line with finance theory. 
Prudent person rules also tend to include limits on self-investment, but this is not 
the case for 401(k) plans in the U.S., despite the losses at Enron and WorldCom 
(Galer 2002).
Traditionally there has been a division between countries adopting PPR and 
QAR that corresponds broadly to that of the Anglo-Saxon countries versus Europe 
and Japan as well as emerging markets. Nevertheless, the past several years have 
seen a broad shift from QAR to PPR. The logic of the argument for PPR has been 
followed, for example, in the Institutions for Occupations Retirement Provision 
(IORP) Directive in Europe and recent shifts to PPR in countries such as Japan. 
Nevertheless, this shift is not universal: for example, Germany retains limits such 
as 35 percent equity for its ‘Pensionskassen’ and limits on asset classes that can be 
invested in, and in this it is followed by many emerging market economies (OECD 
2013).
The shift to PPR has also involved a change in the roles of regulators, away 
from evaluating and checking portfolios and toward assessing the validity of a 
plan’s approach to investment. For example, under PPR, regulators must test 
the behavior of the asset manager, the institutional investor, and the process of 
decision-making. Regulators must evaluate whether a ‘due diligence’ investigation 
has been undertaken in formulating the plan’s strategic asset allocation. A pension 
institution would also be expected to have a coherent and explicit statement of 
investment principles. PPR thus necessitates a wider degree of transparency for 
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the institutions, including, in particular, identification of lines of responsibility for 
decisions and of detailed practices of asset management to be discussed in more 
detail below.
The means of applying PPR varies. For example, trustees in the U.K. are not 
required to have investment knowledge, but they must obtain proper advice on the 
topic. Accordingly, regulation has, in effect, been supplemented by the role of the 
investment consultant. Meanwhile, in the U.S., the pension fund manager’s deci-
sions have to be justified by reference to those of investment professionals (pru-
dent expert rule), maximizing risk-adjusted returns on a well-diversified portfolio. 
These have both tended to involve high equity holdings (OECD 2012). Although 
Continental European countries have also switched to the prudent person rule, 
they have held more conservative portfolios. This relates partly to tighter solvency 
regulations for DB and risk-based regulation for both DB and DC, to be elabo-
rated below.
The Evolving Regulation of DB Plans
Besides the portfolio regulations noted above, the traditional regulation of DB 
funds has related to the funding of benefits and ownership of surpluses. By defini-
tion, a DC plan is always fully funded as assets equal liabilities, whereas with DB 
plans there is a distinction between the pension plan obligations or contractual 
rights to the participants and the fund assets to providing collateral for the prom-
ised benefits. This in turn gives rise to shortfall risk, which implies a danger that 
pension promises are not fulfilled.
Key aspects underlying the evolution of DB regulation in different countries 
relate to differences in how the pension fund is conceptualized, divisions of respon-
sibility, and risk-sharing between employers and employees (Laboul and Yermo 
2006). In the Anglo-Saxon region, the basis of safety is the solvency of the spon-
sor who bears the underwriting risk, backed by an insurance fund. Accordingly, 
the funds are organized as trusts securing the assets, but the plan is kept close 
to the company, with considerable flexibility in regulation and amortization of 
shortfalls. In Continental Europe, by contrast, pension funds have significant 
operational autonomy and offer guarantees with sponsors providing a form of 
reinsurance (or even more limited responsibility). Insurance funds are absent and 
funding rules more strict. Here the pension fund is legally independent, and eco-
nomically it is akin to a life insurance company and regulated accordingly.
DB plans have suffered successive financial market shocks in the past dozen 
years, with the dotcom crisis and the subprime crisis affecting their equity hold-
ings severely, the extent of which depended on their prior holdings of such assets. 
The resultant shortfall risk implied dangers to retirement income security. These 
crises challenged the traditional flexible approach of Anglo-Saxon regulators, as 
well as challenging the less flexible approach in Continental Europe (Laboul and 
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Yermo 2006). As noted by Franzen (2010), the ‘perfect pension storm’ that has 
been experienced led the risk management revolution to extend to the pension 
industry, superimposed on traditional forms of regulation, whereas it had pre-
viously been confined to other sectors, notably banks (see also Lundbergh et al. 
2014). This has in turn been reinforced by regulation requiring risk manage-
ment, also justified by the development of guarantees and shaped by the changing 
accounting standards for pensions and the shift to PPR as noted above.
The Shift to Risk-based Regulation and the Link to 
Solvency Regulation
Kocken (2006) defines risk management for a financial institution as a process 
starting at a strategic level. It begins with analyzing risk factors for a pension fund 
and its stakeholders, which is followed by a decision regarding the acceptable level 
of risk, and ends at the operational level in measuring and controlling risk. Banks 
have been in a process of shifting from returns-driven management to risk man-
agement for some decades, with a particular milestone being the Basel Capital 
Adequacy Accord of 1988 and its extension in 1996 to cover use of approved mod-
els for market risk to calculate capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2006). The underlying shift of focus from return to risk was in turn a consequence 
of the wave of global financial crises that began in 1973 after a long period of 
quiescence since 1945 (Davis 1995a), and notably the Latin American debt crisis 
that began in 1982. There is a clear parallel between these seismic events affecting 
banks and triggering changes in the focus of regulation and the more recent mar-
ket crises impacting on DB pension fund solvency.
Yet this transition in banking regulation did not initially affect pension funds 
and their regulators in Europe, although DB plans are clearly subject to under-
writing or actuarial risk—risks that they might not fulfill contractual obligations 
to customers. These, in turn, are linked to longevity risk and inflation risk; they 
also bear market risk on their assets and the risk of asset/liability mismatch. But, 
as noted above, pension funds are not subject to liquidity risk, arguably the main 
concern of banks and their regulators in risk management. Traditionally pen-
sion fund risk managers have focused instead on choosing appropriate assets to 
derive a strategic asset allocation and manage the market risk, largely ignoring 
liabilities. But increasingly, larger funds have begun to use asset liability man-
agement (ALM), eventually deriving the optimal strategic asset allocation in a 
liability-consistent way, assessing the impact of decisions not only of investment 
but also of contributions and indexation of benefits. In this sense, risk-based regu-
lation has grown up from best practice in individual pension plans.
Franzen (2010) argues that pension funds in the major industrial countries 
manage risk today according to differing concepts of the underlying pension 
promise as defined previously. This explains why Continental pension funds such 
as the Dutch were in the lead in risk-based regulation. Also, Anglo-Saxon country 
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regulators have been traditionally more lenient with respect to risk-taking than 
Continentals (Laboul and Yermo 2006).
Risk-based regulation of pension funds was first prompted by the dotcom bust 
of 2001–3, which led to widespread underfunding of DB pensions (Davis and de 
Haan 2012). The subprime crisis was a further spur. It can be argued that the 
introduction of risk-based regulation for DB funds enables pension funds to make 
proper use of complex markets and instruments, and to allocate scarce supervi-
sory resources efficiently (Brunner et al. 2008). It has also been driven by the inte-
gration of financial supervision in the Netherlands, as well as in DC countries 
Denmark and Australia. Thus, the Dutch and Australians seek to apply a similar 
form of financial regulation to pension funds as to banks and insurance compa-
nies, adapted nonetheless to the economics of pension funds (Brunner et al. 2008).
Risk-based management requires sound risk management within the institu-
tion—including a risk management strategy, board involvement, fulfillment of 
risk management functions, and internal controls. Evaluation of corporate gov-
ernance rules for risk management architecture becomes an important role of the 
regulator, although large and small funds are not expected to be equally sophisti-
cated. In practice, regulators typically do not require a specific form of risk man-
agement architecture; there are links between the form of risk-based regulation 
and the varying structural form of pension funds and pension promises discussed 
above. Thus, for example, asset liability management (ALM) is mandatory in the 
Netherlands and Germany, whereas in the U.K. it is only encouraged, and in the 
U.S. regulators are neutral. Accordingly, the role of regulators in the former coun-
tries must include evaluation of models and strategies based on ALM, not essential 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In fact, mandatory use of ALM can be criticized, in 
the sense that it is subject to model risk and the breakdown of underlying assump-
tions. And if all pension funds were to adopt a similar model, they could be subject 
to herding, volatility, and liquidity crises in capital markets, worsening aggregate 
risk.
More fundamentally, it can be argued that when pension fund models include 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), they could be in danger of imposing an inappropriately short 
time horizon on pension funds and excessive concern about market risk (Shi and 
Werker 2012). Indeed, Campbell and Viceira (2002) note that when equities are 
subject to mean reversion, and taking human capital into account, equities can 
be secure assets for long-term investors such as pension funds. But this argument 
may break down when taking into account a plan’s integration with the sponsor, 
which is assumed to provide a backup for shortfalls. Mergers and bankruptcies 
are examples in which the state of the sponsor limits the horizon of investment of 
the pension fund. And new accounting standards also impact the time horizon of 
investment, as will be discussed further on in the chapter.
Stress testing is another key aspect of risk-based regulation. For example, 
since 2005, the most important tool of the regulator in Germany is a stress 
test (within the ALM) to ensure that funds retain 100 percent funding under 
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various capital market scenarios (Franzen 2010). Sale of assets may be required 
to meet the test, so this is one explanation why funds there are typically well 
below their 35 percent limit on equities. Since 2007, Dutch funds have had to 
run scenario-based solvency tests showing that they have only a 2.5 percent 
probability of falling below 100 percent funding (excluding conditional index-
ation) within a year (Franzen 2010). There are methods based on simplified 
and standard methods prescribed by the regulator, but also internal models 
are permitted, as in most recent global accords on banking regulation, Basel II 
and III. But stress tests are only as useful as the likelihood of the scenarios they 
depict coming about, and if they are imposed mechanistically they can lead to 
complacency about exposure to risk.
Risk scoring is a further aspect of risk-based supervision. Pension regula-
tors in the Netherlands use a common model for assessing pension funds for 
banks and insurance companies (Financial Institutions Risk Analysis Method, 
or FIRM). This is a four-stage approach to assessing risk, requiring a detailed 
profile of the fund, identifying relevant management units, assessing gross 
risks and giving scores, and then seeking insight into the quality of risk con-
trols in each category for a view of overall risk. This, in turn, drives the fre-
quency of on-site inspections. As discussed below, risk scoring is also a feature 
of risk-based supervision of DC funds in countries such as Denmark, Australia, 
and Mexico.
In the wake of the dotcom crisis, pension authorities also began to impose 
higher funding ratios. Franzen (2010) argues that solvency ratios are not an ulti-
mate goal of pension funds, but rather an instrument of risk management imposed 
by the regulatory authorities. The U.K. 2004 Pensions Act and the 2006 U.S. 
Pension Protection Act, for example, tightened funding rules in those countries, 
with the U.S. shortening periods of smoothing of asset values and liability dis-
count rates from five to two years.
Meanwhile the Dutch introduced a full model-based approach to solvency 
regulation similar to that used for insurance and banking, with longevity, mar-
ket, currency, and interest rate risks all covered and asset–liability mismatches 
penalized, though a 15-year period is allowed to amortize shortfalls (Franzen 
2010). Whereas the minimum solvency buffer is 5 percent, in practice consid-
eration of the risks and the stress tests require pension funds to be 30 percent 
overfunded. As noted by Brunner et al. (2008), the new Dutch system is seen as 
costly and could discourage provision of DB pensions; more onerous supervi-
sion may also have played a role in the shift to career-average-based DB and 
conditional indexation.
These conceptual differences highlighted above are reflected in the differences 
in the ways in which regulators approach funding. The U.K. approach to funding 
is principles-based and relies on regulation of governance. It is scheme-specific 
with no general rules for funding recovery periods. Meanwhile, the Dutch 
approach is a rule- and risk-based approach focused on fair value, in line with 
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banking concepts. The U.S. offers a hybrid combining governance principles with 
quantitative rules on funding—amortizing shortfalls in seven years, discounting 
liabilities with corporate bond yields and limiting smoothing to two years. (Public 
plans are allowed 30 years to amortize shortfalls; Impavido and Tower 2009.)
The Development of Guarantees
The passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 
led to the introduction of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for 
private sector DB funds in the United States. This enterprise has become a model 
for the extension of such guarantees in other countries seeking to protect ben-
eficiaries against risk of sponsor insolvency. In particular, the U.K. introduced 
the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in its 2004 Pension Act to pay compensation 
to members of eligible DB pension schemes in the event of employer insolvency, 
where there are insufficient assets in the fund to cover Pension Protection Fund 
levels of compensation. Existing schemes are charged an annual levy, which is a 
mixture of scheme-based and risk-based levies (Liu and Tonks 2008).
The scheme-based levy is based on the plan’s pension liabilities and makes up 
20 percent of the total pension protection levy. The risk-based levy is based on the 
plan’s underfunding risk and the insolvency risk of the sponsoring firm. The PPF 
Board, a government entity, considers the level of underfunding and the likeli-
hood of sponsoring employer insolvency (based on external rating agencies). It 
may also consider the plan’s asset allocation and any other risk factors.
Although guarantees seek to protect beneficiaries against risk, they pose risks 
in themselves to the guarantors, particularly if incentives are not appropriate. 
McCarthy and Neuberger (2005) suggest that there is a large chance that the U.K. 
PPF will default on its liabilities if it sticks with its proposed levy structure. Also it 
faces severe moral hazard and agency problems, not least because the financing 
burdens are placed mainly on riskier funds. More generally, the development of 
pension insurance involves additional agencies regulating DB funds with the risk 
of overlap and contradiction. It also puts greater pressure on regulators to impose 
stricter funding rules and asset/liability management to avoid calls on insurance 
funds that may themselves discourage DB pension provision.
The Role of Accounting Standards
Whereas pension funds are economically subject to longevity risk and wage or 
inflation risk, under the influence of accounting standards they must take increas-
ing account of interest rate risk (Franzen 2010). Accounting standards are seen as 
an aspect of regulation since they are a form of market discipline, but they may 
also impinge on the investment horizon of pension funds. They integrate the spon-
sor and the fund into one accounting unit valued at market prices, thus leaving the 
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sponsor’s balance sheet vulnerable to short-term market risk arising from pension 
fund considerations. The sponsor may hence require the fund, independent of 
regulation, to invest on a shorter time horizon than would otherwise be the case. 
Accounting pressures and mark-to-market may also limit investment in illiquid 
assets such as private placements and private equity, which may increase shortfall 
risk since these assets are potentially high-yielding.
In practice, there is often an inconsistency between the accounting and actu-
arial approaches to pension fund valuation. Actuarial approaches tend to look 
at a fund on an ongoing basis, focusing on accrued and not projected liabilities. 
Traditional accounting approaches recognize the pension contributions as costs 
on the sponsor’s financial statement, but they do not expose the sponsor to market 
risk from the pension fund, not least given smoothing and long periods between 
valuations. The mark-to-market approach to assets and liabilities currently grow-
ing in popularity means that the focus is increasingly on the current financial 
situation of the pension fund, allowing for projected values (Franzen 2010). As 
noted above, in the U.K. there is also a third form of valuation required by the 
PPF, related to the cost of buying out liabilities with an insurance company. This 
has created a dilemma for sponsors, since regulators often focus on the actuarial 
values while, due to capital market pressures, firms need to take the accounting 
values into account. The importance of interest rates in calculating accounting 
liabilities means interest rate risk, which is not an economic risk for ongoing pen-
sion funds, becomes dominant.
Indeed, the combination of risk-based regulation with market value account-
ing has led to a focus on liability-driven investment whose goal is to manage 
interest rate risk such as immunization and dedication (Franzen 2010). These 
practices are much costlier than traditional strategies that would have been 
adopted in risk/return optimization or even ALM. Given their high cost, they 
are also inducing firms in the U.K. to opt out of provision of DB pensions. But 
on the positive side, liability-driven approaches adopted by the U.K. Boots plc 
pension fund also appear to have enabled the plans to ride out the subprime 
crisis without a shortfall (Skypala 2011). The alternative approach of greater 
diversification using financial innovations such as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs) proved more than counterproductive, due not only to defaults but 
also to mark-to-market losses as illiquidity set in and false perceptions of credit 
quality were corrected.
Accounting pressures on pension funds have arguably contributed to a further 
trend involving market-based calculations of liabilities for regulatory purposes. 
In the light of the development of guarantee funds, the fragility of sponsors, and 
recent financial turmoil, some argue that regulators should be more concerned 
with measures of termination or wind-up liabilities, as opposed to those for an 
ongoing fund. Recently, the Dutch shifted to a market-value basis for liabilities 
and not a fixed rate, while in 2004–5 the U.S. shifted from a 30-year Treasury 
bond yield to a corporate bond yield where the timing of future benefits will 
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determine the yield (Laboul and Yermo 2006). Smoothing of the latter helps 
reduce the impact of short-run market turbulence.
Evolving Regulation of DC Plans
DC funds have not been immune to the asset market volatility caused by the 
global financial crisis, with losses of as much as 25 percent of portfolios (OECD 
2009). This has naturally put a focus on investment risks, highlighting the ongo-
ing importance of costs and annuitization which can also put retirement income 
security in jeopardy, as well as that of DC holders’ level of financial knowledge.
The Regulation of Costs
Many charges are applied to DC funds, including flat rate fees (e.g. a monthly 
policy fee unrelated to the fund size), deductions from the fund (e.g. the annual 
management charge is usually expressed as a percentage of the fund value), initial 
charges (e.g. set-up costs such as the bid–offer spread: the difference between the 
prices at which investments are bought and sold), and exit charges (e.g. the transfer 
fee if a member transfers to a different scheme; U.K. Parliament 2012).
There is a growing awareness that DC plans can be very costly for beneficiar-
ies, considerably reducing the pensions accumulated relative to the returns on the 
underlying portfolios. For this reason there is a risk that accumulations will fall 
short of what is desired for a comfortable retirement. This is particularly true if 
these are individually managed plans, suggesting a need for regulatory interven-
tion to limit costs. In a low-inflation environment the impact of costs is even more 
noticeable.
One option is direct regulation of costs. Under the U.K. Stakeholder scheme, 
costs are limited to 1 percent of assets per annum, and the new ‘NEST’ plan aims 
to deliver to all employees and the self-employed the opportunity to save for a 
pension at the annual management charge of 0.3 percent per year or less ‘today 
enjoyed only by employees of large firms, by public sector employees or by high 
income individuals’ (U.K. Parliament 2012: 28).
In mandatory funded schemes, direct regulation of fees is common, with 
maximum fees imposed in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia 
as well as in Central and Eastern Europe (Tapia and Yermo 2008). In Poland, 
progressively lower limits are being imposed on fees to put pressure on providers 
to economize. There may also be restrictions on types of fees, as, for example, in 
Argentina, where pension funds may only charge fees on contributions.
Another way to limit costs is to create a market structure that generates com-
petition via a central agency or clearing house for pensions, as in Sweden (Tapia 
and Yermo 2008). This separates costs of fund collection and management from 
those of asset management, limits marketing costs, and ensures a government 
176 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
monopsony to put pressure on asset managers’ fees. The central clearinghouse 
negotiates fees with providers, and a proportion of fees must be rebated to par-
ticipants so they share in economies of scale in asset management. Similar low 
costs are ensured in Bolivia by limiting the market to two competitors selected by 
an international bidding process for the lowest fees, and restricting competition 
between them (Tapia and Yermo 2008). Nevertheless, low costs in Bolivia may 
also relate to low costs of asset management for government bonds. Competition 
per se, without such structures, has tended to increase costs owing to the expendi-
ture necessary to encourage members to switch suppliers. Chile is an example of 
this, with there being no direct regulation limiting fees and the hope that compe-
tition would limit them, when in fact fees there have remained high despite the 
maturity of the system (Tapia and Yermo 2008).
Another regulatory response to the problem of high costs has been to enforce 
greater transparency, as in the U.S., where 401(k) plans are now required by 
the SEC to disclose charges. Similarly, in Australia, the Cooper Review led to 
tough disclosure rules. In the U.K., there have been industry initiatives such as 
the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) code on disclosure. However, 
given the lack of understanding by beneficiaries, as discussed later in the chapter, 
such initiatives may not lower charges.
The Regulation of Risks and Outcomes
Besides costs, the outcome of DC plans and consequent risk to beneficiaries 
depends on the efficiency of the investment process. Accordingly, the nature of 
portfolio regulations plays a significant role for such schemes. As noted above, 
there is a trend to move from quantitative restrictions to prudent person rules that 
apply both to DC and DB schemes. Nevertheless, countries with pure mandatory 
DC schemes tend to have QAR (Antolín et al. 2009).
Besides limiting holdings of volatile assets, QAR may apply a minimum invest-
ment return, as in mandatory funds in Switzerland, which the government has 
been forced to reduce owing to market conditions. Or there may be an extension 
of the forms of risk-based regulation discussed above for DB schemes, as in the 
case of stress tests in Denmark and a daily value-at-risk ceiling as in Mexico based 
on the volatility of individual member accounts (based, in turn, on asset prices 
over 500 days; see Brunner et al. 2008). The Danish system is a hybrid of DB and 
DC with return guarantees and hence risk-sharing, but is classified here as DC. 
The stress test based on asset composition provides a ‘traffic light’ indication of 
solvency, which drives regulatory intervention (Brunner et al. 2008).
In Australia, pension funds are subject to risk scoring as for other financial 
institutions, in line with the Netherlands. Although funds are DC, the system 
takes into account institutions’ exposure to financial risks and ability to manage 
them (including investment strategies and asset allocation), by looking not only 
at portfolio allocations but also how risk management compares to industry best 
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practice. Risk scoring then leads to a degree of supervisory oversight and interven-
tion (Brunner et al. 2008). Denmark and Australia, like the Netherlands, require 
a risk management plan or risk management guidelines during licensing, and the 
aim through risk scoring is to induce funds to take on best practice in risk man-
agement. Australia introduced licensing of trustees at the same time as risk-based 
supervision and has seen a number of trustees leave the industry; in other words, 
there has been industry consolidation.
For DC funds in these countries, risk-based regulation has at times been a 
quid pro quo for easing of investment restrictions (Brunner et al. 2008), and this 
has entailed a more diversified portfolio in Mexico. On the other hand, the 
Mexican VaR ceiling is criticized in Antolín et al. (2009), as it is centered on a 
zero mean return while a pension fund needs to consider non-zero means in the 
returns distribution. Such tools may force pension funds, which are not subject 
to liquidity risk, to invest in lower risk assets and thereby harm the outcome at 
retirement, as well as inducing them to sell equities when markets are falling. 
They may also be vulnerable to modeling error. Brunner et al. (2008) note that 
it is only manageable to require such a detailed specification of risk manage-
ment (including precise details of board structure and risk models to use) for all 
funds when they are small in number, as in Mexico. Meanwhile, the Danish 
risk-based supervision system is seen as generating shifts from hybrid to pure 
DC across the funds, partly driven by workers seeking higher returns that come 
without guarantees.
Whereas risk-based supervision is readily applied to DB funds, as in the 
Netherlands, it is less clear whether it is appropriate for DC funds, which lack 
a concept of ‘solvency.’ Instead, some suggest that income replacement tar-
gets should be implemented, and scenarios based on contributions and returns 
(Brunner et al. 2008).
For individual contracts, there may be investment rules that apply in addition 
to—or instead of—QAR or PPR. The provision of a default option is becoming 
more common across DC schemes, when individuals may not have the informa-
tion to invest freely with confidence. Particularly in mandatory schemes, this may 
entail a form of lifestyle or target date fund which may protect individuals from 
losses in volatile assets as they draw close to retirement. The age of the participant 
does affect the nature of the portfolio limits in Chile and Mexico, for example. 
But it does not in E.U. countries with similar schemes. For instance in Estonia, 
Hungary, and the Slovak Republic, there is a single default option with zero or 
few equities. Arguably, this may not be appropriate for younger workers who 
can afford to take more risk. A similar problem arises in a more acute form in 
Colombia, Israel, and Poland, which allow no fund choice at all.
By contrast, Australia and Sweden allow providers to establish their own choice 
menus and individuals to elect therein freely, which may lead to excessive equity 
exposure for older workers. Some types of voluntary DC fund also involve life-
style default options as in stakeholder funds in the U.K., although default options 
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are less common in voluntary schemes. Impavido and Tower (2009) suggest that 
default options in the U.S. could reduce the impact of shocks such as the subprime 
crisis on pension wealth, and hence on household expenditures.
Antolín et al. (2009) show that mean-variance efficient portfolios with low or 
high equity exposure may not be efficient for pension provision given the trade-off 
between expected replacement ratio and risk. And a dynamic risk budgeting 
strategy may be superior to zero equities for the years approaching retirement, 
although calculating this would be challenging for individuals. They also empha-
size that there is no ‘single recipe’ for DC plans, so factors such as desired par-
ticipation rates, cultural attitudes to financial risks, and the nature of the pension 
promise will affect appropriate regulation of outcomes.
Regulation of Annuitization
Annuities can protect individuals from longevity risk, though these are tradition-
ally very little used when voluntary. In the U.S. and Australia, this links to tax 
disincentives. In Australia, there are no restrictions on payout options from the 
second pillar, which reduces annuitization demand (Rocha et al. 2010). This is 
unusual for countries with mandatory funded schemes which typically are tight-
ening regulations on lump sums, as in Chile in 2004 and 2008, where a growing 
proportion of average wages must be provided in the form of a real annuity for the 
minimum pension plus a variable annuity or a phased withdrawal.
Other forms of regulation of annuities include those related to prudential regu-
lation of insurance companies, conduct of business regulation of insurance com-
panies, and other aspects of the regulation of annuities within the overall pension 
system (Davis 2004). These topics are largely beyond the scope of this chapter; 
suffice to note that risk-based regulation and strict solvency rules are more appro-
priate for the provision of annuities, which are guaranteed products, than they are 
for DC and (to a lesser extent) DB pension plans discussed earlier in the chapter.
As regards further regulation of annuities per se, Swiss regulations fix the pric-
ing of annuities—which causes difficulties when bond yields fall (including cross 
subsidies between individuals). Then the conversion factors have had to be repeat-
edly lowered, although they are generally higher than could be obtained on the 
open market, thus encouraging annuitization via the occupational pension fund 
(Rocha et al. 2010). In Sweden, under the centralized funded system, only two 
options are offered and annuitization is obligatory. One is a with-profits annuity 
with minimum guaranteed benefits, which in 2007 had its guarantee cut from 
2.75 percent to zero with the hope of raising returns and bonuses. In fact most 
retirees select the unit-linked alternative from the asset managers where risks and 
returns are higher (Rocha et al. 2010).
Marketing of annuities is not widely regulated beyond conduct of business 
rules, except in Chile, which has a licensing regulation for pension advisors as well 
as caps on broker commissions and an electronic quotation system. This quotation 
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system is aimed to reduce brokers’ influence on costs and hence returns by provid-
ing consumers with direct access to a full range of commission quotes.
Annuity regulations are changing also in countries with voluntary schemes. In 
the U.S., withdrawal from DC funds is becoming more restrictive, while in the 
U.K. it is becoming less so, with former levels of compulsion in annuitization no 
longer applying, partly under pressure from low bond yields. Turner and Hughes 
(2008) note that historically lax regulation of DC fund payouts may have acceler-
ated the shift from DB to DC in the U.S., while in contrast, the requirement of 
annuitization in Canada may have decelerated the shift by ensuring a ‘level playing 
field’. This does not explain the shift in the U.K., where such a level playing field 
also prevails—the mandatory inflation indexation requirement for DB pensions in 
payment may be more decisive (Ashcraft 2008; McCarthy and Neuberger 2009).
Transparency and Financial Education
As highlighted earlier in the chapter, pension benefits from DC plans are inher-
ently uncertain and affected by returns on investment, discount rates, inflation, 
wages, and employment, as well as life expectancies. Participants must make deci-
sions at a time when the outcomes in these factors are unknown.
For risk-based systems of regulation as in Denmark and Mexico, market dis-
cipline is established by ensuring individuals and sponsors are well informed, 
since there is scope to change providers. In Australia and Mexico, auditors also 
assess the quality of risk management and must report problems to the supervi-
sor. Nevertheless, supervisory ratings are not typically disclosed to the market. 
Whereas this is understandable for banks, given the risk of a ‘run,’ this is not a con-
sideration for pension funds and disclosure would seem to be appropriate. In Chile, 
efforts are made to help members further by communicating those choices and 
their implications on a regular basis, as well as giving projections showing likely 
future pensions by way of pension statements and pension risk simulators. These 
complement the electronic quotation system for annuities highlighted above.
Pension statements usually include a member’s current balance asset allocation, 
and they can also provide projections about future benefits (although projected 
pension benefits are never certain). Meanwhile, questions regarding the returns 
on investments, whether the person will lose his job, or how long the person will 
live are among the factors that generate uncertainty. Pension risk simulators, used 
in Chile since 2005, can be used to help employees understand related uncertainty 
about projected future pension benefits.
To convey this uncertainty, members need projections they can readily compre-
hend. There are two main approaches to providing projected future pension ben-
efits: deterministic or stochastic projections. The latter offer a range with associated 
probabilities. A particular advantage of stochastic modeling is that it allows for the 
uncertainty regarding projections of future benefits from DC pension plans to be 
quantified. The drawback is that results may be complex and difficult to understand.
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Despite such advances, surveys cited in Tapia and Yermo (2008) show that 
knowledge of fees is poor in countries such as Poland and Chile. In Poland, there is 
limited understanding of types of fees paid and 40 percent did not know there is a 
transfer fee between accounts. In Chile 96 percent of people did not know pension 
companies receive management fees as a proportion of monthly payments. Since 
fees are a major determinant of returns and consequent pensions, transparency is 
again not sufficient.
This discussion highlights the need for education about pensions to comple-
ment these forms of transparency, without which beneficiaries will be unaware 
of risks to retirement income until it is too late. This remains absent, or at least 
mainly on paper rather than in practice in most countries. It is of course of par-
ticular relevance where there is a major element of choice in pension saving and 
hence in retirement income, such as in countries without mandatory funded 
schemes or substantial pay-as-you-go pensions.
The Evolution of Pension Portfolios
Fair valuation principles used for accounting purposes have been a key factor 
behind the decline in equity allocations in pension fund portfolios in the United 
Kingdom, according to Severinson and Yermo (2012). Risk-based funding regu-
lations have also contributed to the declining equity allocation among pension 
funds and pension insurance companies in countries such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands. In complementary work, Shi and Werker (2012) show that the 
imposition of an annual expected shortfall constraint, or a VaR constraint on 
a long-term investor, can lead to an economic cost of 2.5–3.8 percent of initial 
wealth over a 15-year horizon.
These points should not be exaggerated, however, as there has also been a 
shift to private equity, hedge funds, real estate, and, most recently, unlisted infra-
structure equity held in pension funds. Accordingly, risk in pension portfolios has 
not necessarily fallen. Although bond allocations have increased, particularly in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, derisking is more evident in the growing use 
of interest risk-hedging instruments (such as swaps and options) than in the net 
change in investment risk in the main asset portfolio. There are also perceptions 
of changes in long-term asset returns which underlie shifts in portfolios (see also 
Moore and Pedersen 2014).
Emerging Concerns
Longevity Risk
Longevity is a key determinant of liabilities of DB plans as well as the retirement 
income provided by DC plans (Cairns 2014). U.S. DB plans from 1995 to 2007 
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appear to have retained use of outdated mortality tables (from 1983), and few 
plans used the latest available data (IMF 2012). Pension liabilities may be under-
estimated by at least 12 percent as a consequence, implying a major risk of inad-
equate funding. In Switzerland, despite the mandatory funded system, pension 
funds can also choose their own mortality tables and discount rates for estimating 
liabilities (Rocha et al. 2010). In the Netherlands, a change in the mortality table 
in 2010 led to an increase in measured liabilities of 7 percent. Because of the way in 
which liabilities are calculated, longevity risk is particularly sizeable in a low inter-
est rate environment. Using the methodology proposed by Impavido (2011), at a 
6 percent interest rate, a three-year rise in longevity raises liabilities by 8 percent, 
but at 2 percent interest liabilities rise 14 percent.
One response has been to increase risk-sharing. Dutch pension regulators 
have arrived at an accord that stabilizes contributions, ensures up-to-date mor-
tality calculations, and requires the risk of longevity and market performance to 
be reflected in retirement ages and benefits (IMF 2012). Such a shift is likely to 
make DB funds in that country more sustainable. Market-based transfers of lon-
gevity risk could also occur via buy-ins, buyouts (both with insurers), and lon-
gevity bonds. Meanwhile it is essential that countries ensure mortality tables are 
updated, as was apparently not the case in some U.S. pension funds.
Procyclicality of Funding and Investment Rules
Risk-based regulation and fair value accounting could incentivize procyclical 
investment behavior such as the fire-sale of assets in market downturns (Severinson 
and Yermo 2012). Besides generating unnecessary losses for pension funds per se, 
this could lead to price distortions in less liquid markets, as witnessed during the 
2008–9 crisis in some maturity segments of derivatives markets used by pension 
funds and life insurers to hedge interest rate risks. This effect is compounded by 
a supply problem in long-term government bonds, as pension and insurance lia-
bilities are often substantially larger than the stock of long-term government debt. 
Besides fire sales, inappropriately designed regulations could force companies 
to contribute heavily after a crash while not incentivizing build-up of contribu-
tions in an upturn (Impavido and Tower 2009). These can have a macroeconomic 
impact on company investment, to add to other macroeconomic effects via pen-
sion funds, such as those on personal wealth, and via calling of government guar-
antees. Moreover, Antolín and Stewart (2009) and Yermo and Severinson (2010) 
show that after the crisis there were measures of regulatory forbearance such as 
longer periods to recover shortfalls (in Canada, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.), mora-
toria on contributions (in Japan) and lower minimum returns (in Switzerland). 
Besides allowing funds to remain viable, they prevented damaging fire sales of 
assets that could have further destabilized markets.
Yet regulations remain damagingly procyclical (Yermo and Severinson 
2010), meaning that it will be important to reduce the reliance on current market 
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values when determining contributions. In particular, it has been suggested that 
smoothed discount ratios could be used for liabilities, as is already the case in the 
U.S. and Japan. Or, as in Canada, regulators could use average rather than cur-
rent solvency ratios in calculating minimum funding requirements. There could 
be greater encouragement of surpluses in good times via more flexible tax ceil-
ings, while also limiting contribution holidays and sponsor access to surpluses. 
And the calculation of minimum funding could pay more attention to security 
mechanisms such as insurance schemes that are in place. These suggestions, of 
course, are in contrast to the development of risk-based and market value-based 
regulation highlighted above.
Conclusion
In the wake of the market crises over the last decade, along with a growing aware-
ness of the shortcomings of pension plan finances, there has been widespread 
innovation in the regulatory field. Increasingly, and appropriately, regulation has 
grown more focused on risk to beneficiaries both within the portfolio and arising 
from other aspects of pension systems such as costs and lack of consumer educa-
tion. In this context, we highlight countries such as the Netherlands (for DB) and 
Sweden and Australia (for DC) as having regulatory innovations worthy of atten-
tion, although some shortcomings remain, as discussed above. We have argued 
that further progress in managing and controlling risk remains vital, for example 
in the fields of longevity risk, procyclical behavior of funds, and financial educa-
tion. These remain threats to retirement income security that regulators need to 
bear in mind in future reforms.
It has also been shown that a number of regulatory developments have been 
counterproductive, inducing pension funds to be increasingly short-term in their 
investments and focusing on interest rate risk, which is not economically relevant 
for pension funds. In this light it is worth asking whether pension funds need a 
Basel III in the wake of the crisis—a new global regulation like that currently 
being introduced for banks (Basel Committee 2012). As noted, the successive 
Basel agreements have put an increasing focus on the need for sufficient capital to 
protect against solvency risk, but also measurement of risk and, in the case of Basel 
III, including consideration of macroprudential as well as individual institution 
risk.
Some would contend that global agreements are not needed, since pen-
sion funds do not compete across borders and pension policy remains national. 
Moreover, failure of a pension fund does not usually generate significant exter-
nalities either within countries or across borders. That said, some global similarity 
in the regulation of company funds would be beneficial to multinationals, which 
are forced at present to set up individual and idiosyncratic funds in each of their 
operating countries. As noted, Basel III tightens solvency regulations for banks, 
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and similar tightening might help pension funds, although it could at some point 
also become counterproductive by enforcing holding of low-return assets and/or 
inducing procyclical investment and portfolios. Liquidity regulations for banks 
are being introduced for the first time at a global level with Basel III. These do 
not apply to pension funds, given that their liabilities are long-term—although 
for mature funds and especially those that are winding down, liquidity is more 
important. Furthermore, one area of particular interest which does feed through 
from Basel III is the idea of offsetting procyclicality. As noted, the easing of pen-
sion regulations on an ad hoc basis has followed the subprime crisis. The next 
challenge will be to develop and implement risk-based regulation sufficient to 
ensure there are not undue and counterproductive countercyclical shifts in pen-
sion asset portfolios, forcing sponsors to sell shares at the very point when they are 
likely to be most profitable. This may in turn be generated by inappropriate forms 
of risk-based supervision. Furthermore, as in Basel III, macroprudential regula-
tion of pension funds may need to be developed, given the often-neglected macro-
economic consequences of their collective behavior.
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